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Abstract
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric-key block cipher
for electronic data announced by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIS T ) in 2001. The encryption process is based on symmetric
key (using the same key for both encryption and decryption) for block encryp-
tion of 128, 192, and 256 bits in size. AES and its standardized authentication
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) have been adopted in numerous security-based
applications. GCM is a mode of operation for AES symmetric key crypto-
graphic block ciphers, which has been selected for its high throughput rates in
high speed communication channels.
The GCM is an algorithm for authenticated encryption to provide both data
authenticity and confidentiality that can be achieved with reasonable hardware
resources. The hardware implementation of the AES-GCM demands tremen-
dous amount of logic blocks and gates. Due to natural faults or intrusion at-
tacks, faulty outputs in different logic blocks of the AES-GCM module results
in erroneous output. There exist plenty of specific literature on methods of fault
detection in the AES section of the AES-GCM.
In this thesis, we consider a novel fault detection of the GCM section using
parity prediction. For the purpose of fault detection in GCM, two independent
methods are proposed. First, a new technique of fault detection using parity
prediction for the entire GCM loop is presented. Then, matrix based CRC
multiple-bit parity prediction schemes are developed and implemented. As a
ii
result, we achieve the fault coverage of about 99% with the longest path delay
and area overhead of 23% and 10.9% respectively. The false alarm is 0.12%
which can be ignored based on the number of injected faults.
Keywords: Fault Detection, Parity Prediction, AES-GCM, Matrix Based CRC
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Chapter 1
Thesis Contributions and Outline
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Advanced Encryption Standard(AES)
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) has been widely used in cryptosys-
tems after it was introduced by NIS T [14] in 2001. It was a replacement for
Data Encryption Standard (DES) [6]. Since then, many different hardware and
software projects have been developed and implemented to obtain more effi-
cient area and timing results.
1.1.2 Galois/counter Mode(GCM)
The Galois Counter Mode of operation (GCM) [1] is a combined encryption
and authentication process introduced by David Mcgrew and John Viega [22].
The mode is defined in NIST SP 800-38D [35]. The GCM is a mode of op-
eration that uses a universal hash function over a binary Galois field to pro-
vide assurance of the authenticity and the confidentiality of data in its encryp-
tion/decryption. The GCM can also provide authentication assurance for addi-
1
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tional data that is not encrypted. In particular, GCM can detect both accidental
modifications of the data, or unauthorized alterations to ensure proper authen-
tication while protects confidentiality to make the data readable by intended
receiver. It could be implemented into the hardware to achieve high speed op-
eration with low cost and low latency.
The AES-GCM has been widely used in networking communications. In
general, fault detection techniques can be very useful towards the protection of
encryption and malicious attack prevention. The GCM is designed to support
very high data rates due to pipelining and parallel processing techniques as well
as high degree of authenticity and confidentiality. This will result in authenti-
cated encryption at data rates of many tens of Gbps, permitting high grade
encryption and authentication on communication systems. Recently, the GCM
is being used in lower data rate applications. Therefore, much more reliable
fault detection techniques are needed in industry level.
1.2 Motivation and Scope of Thesis
There are two sources of faults in cryptography systems, natural faults and fault
attacks. The natural faults are caused by physical defects in the ASIC or the
electrical circuit malfunction. Four common types of defects occur in logic
gates during the fabrication or due to physical failure i.e., the bridging or short
circuit between adjacent lines, breaks or open circuits, or permanently adopting
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logic 0 or logic 1 which is modeled by stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 respectively
(in general stuck-at-fault). The stuck-at-fault model assumes that only one in-
put or output on each gate will be faulty at a time. Assuming that if more than
one are faulty, a test that can detect any single fault, should easily find multiple
faults.
The intruder attack consists of a series of fault injection into the system to ob-
tain any leakage of secret information, this type of transient fault should also be
detected to prevent such attacks. Therefore, the need for a robust fault detection
method is highly demanded to have much more protection for the integrity and
authenticity of data over the communication channels. As soon as the attacker
inject the fault into the system, the fault detection module generates an error
signal to prevent the system to proceed to the next level. Thus, the attacker
won’t be able to complete the attack sequence. This thesis aims to create a
reliable GCM module which is capable of detecting permanent and transient
faults. To make a system more reliable against faults, there have been three dif-
ferent approaches towards the fault detection [5]. These methods are hardware,
time, and information redundancy. In hardware redundancy technique, one can
duplicate hardware to the system for fault detection which causes 100% fault
detection versus 100% area overhead. In time redundancy approach, the func-
tion of hardware is evaluated in different time slices to detect transient faults.
Again, one can obtain 100 percent fault coverage versus 100% delay increase.
The information redundancy deals with additional extra added information like
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parity bits to the system to locate the faults.
The goal of this thesis is to introduce a novel method of fault detection in
the GCM module using the information redundancy technique by adding parity
bits to the Circuit Under Test (CUT ).
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we have introduced a novel matrix based CRC fault detection ar-
chitecture using multiple bit parity prediction method for entire the GCM loop
with high rate of fault coverage which is about 99%. The proposed scheme is
generic and the number of parity bits can be adjusted based on the available re-
sources and needed fault coverage. The proposed fault detection schemes can
be applied as an universal method of fault detection because of its unique pro-
cessing of CRC pattern generation. The proposed fault injection using VHDL
and Tcl programming makes the design verification and testing easier, faster,
and more reliable. The contributions of the thesis are summarized as follows:
• A new fault detection scheme for the entire GCM module using the GCM
charactristics defined by NIST [35] and Galois field principles including
the formulations and block diagram.
• New approach in using CRC method to generate fault detection patterns
based on the number of the used parity bits. All formulation, CRC patterns
and implementation are covered.
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• A new method of fault injection in the GCM module using the VHDL is
proposed. Both the GCM and fault injection are implemented in VHDL.
• Tcl stimulus script is used to activate the fault injection for simulation of
proposed fault detection to investigate the fault coverage.
• Implementation of the fault detection scheme is performed on FPGA for
area overhead and timing analysis. This thesis outlines an accurate and
reliable GCM module which detects all types of faults in each clock cycle
to prevent sending false information through the communication channels.
1.4 Thesis Outline
We have developed a formal model in hardware that allows us to formulate the
fault detection problem for arbitrary permanent and transient faults in the entire
GCM loop. In Chapter 2, we explain the Authenticated encryption/decryption
in GCM, inputs and outputs of GCM, and the GCM block diagram. We also
outline the principles of Galois field and previous work has been done on AES
and multipliers fault detection. In Chapter 3, we have introduced a novel parity
prediction scheme for entire GCM module using the properties of GCM and ap-
plication of Galois field principles. In Chapter 4, we have established a reliable
matrix based CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) multi- bit parity prediction.
The proposed scheme is generic in terms of the number of used parity bits. If
we increase the number of parity bits, we can achieve close to 100% accuracy
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in detecting permanent and transient faults. Chapter 5 depicts the simulation
results and implementation in FPGA as well as timing and overhead analysis.
A new method of fault injection in the GCM module using VHDL language
and stimulus script programming called Tcl are given in Appendix A&B.
Chapter 2
Priliminaries and Literature Review
In this chapter, we have an overview on the Galois field principles, GCM char-
acteristics and operation, AES operation and related fault detection, and the
multiplier module used in GCM block. The bit-parallel multiplier and the fault
detection in the multiplier module will be discussed. The multiplier consists
of tremendous amount of gates which could generate the faulty output due to
natural or transient faults in any part of its structure. The area overhead of the
multiplier in the GCM is up to 30% of the total space [38]. Therefore, the se-
lection of low complexity multiplier contributes towards the final cost and the
operating frequency.
2.1 Finite Field
Finite field arithmetic [20], [19] has become prominent solution in different ap-
plications like cryptography and digital communication systems. In the GCM
implementation, each ciphertext is treated as an element of a finite field. During
the Tag generation process, each ciphertext or element of the field is multiplied
7
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by Hash Key H, or added to another field element. The element H is consid-
ered constant field element which does not change until the next encryption.
2.1.1 Principles of Galois Field
Only binary field is used in the GCM. Therefore, we explain the Galois Field
GF(2m) which is extensively employed in the GCM implementation. Thus,
we mainly focus on binary extension fields in thesis. The number of elements
in the field is equal to 2m. The elements of the field are represented by poly-
nomials with coefficients belonging to GF(2). The elements of the field are
generated by selecting irreducible polynomial F(x) which cannot be factored
into any polynomials in GF(2m) [23]. All the elements in GF(2m) are repre-
sented by polynomials modulo F(x). The multiplication is done modulo the
selected irreducible polynomial.
2.1.2 Finite Field Arithmetic
Addition In Galois Field
Let A and B represent two elements in GF(2m). Then, one can write each








bixi = bm−1xm−1 + · · · + b0
ai ∈ {0, 1}
bi ∈ {0, 1}
(2.1)
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The addition is componentwise sum of each element in GF(2m) over GF(2)
which can be written as follows
A + B =
m−1∑
i=0
(ai + bi)xi (2.2)
Therefore, addition is performed by bitwise exclusive-or (XOR) of the ele-
ments of the field. Thus, we represent all addition with + sign hereafter which
denotes XOR operation on coordinates of field elements.
Multiplication In Galois Field
The result of multiplication of A and B defined in (2.1) and denoted by S is a
polynomial with order of 2m − 2 shown as
S = AB = s2m−2x2m−2 + · · · + s1x1 + s0 (2.3)
It is reduced to the order of m − 1 after modular reduction, if x is the root
of irreducible polynomial generating the field elements, then the final result of
multiplication depends solely on the chosen irreducible polynomial.
C = AB mod F(x) ∈ GF(2m)
C = cm−1xm−1 + · · · + c0
(2.4)
For the purpose of this thesis, we use the recommended irreducible polynomial
[35] for the GCM in GF(2128) by the following pentonomial
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f (x) = x128 + x7 + x2 + x + 1 (2.5)
2.1.3 Example GF(23)
In order to clarify the concept of irreducible polynomial and the polynomial
basis, an example is given in GF(23) for simplicity. One can extend the con-
cept to GF(2128) which is discussed in the following Chapters.
To define the field structure and elements, we need to define the monic irre-
ducible polynomial f (x) in GF(23) over GF(2). The irreducible polynomial
f (x) is shown in [19] as
f (x) = x3 +
2∑
i=0
fixi fi ∈ {0, 1} (2.6)
It is clear that f0 must be 1, otherwise f (x) is not irreducible and could be
divided by x. The sum of coefficients must be 1, otherwise x+1 will be a factor
and f (x) becomes reducible. Thus, 1 + f2 + f1 + 1 must be 1. Therefore, f1 or f2
must be 0. As result, we outline the following monic polynomials in GF(23).
x3 + x2 + 1 and x3 + x + 1 (2.7)
Either polynomials can be used to define the the elements of the field. If α
is the root of the polynomial f (x), then f (α) = 0 and α3 = α2 + 1. Now, we
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calculate αis shown in Table 2.1.
i αi Binary αi mod f (α)
0 1 001 1
1 2 010 α
2 4 100 α2
3 5 101 α2 + 1
4 7 111 α2 + α + 1
5 3 011 α + 1
6 6 110 α2 + α
7 1 001 1
Table 2.1: αis in GF(8) based on x3 + x2 + 1.
We can easily show that every nonzero element of GF(23) is a power of
α and also the linear combination of the polynomial basis {1, α, α2}. Here, α
is called primitive element. The selection of irreducible polynomial leads to
the maximum number of distinguished elements in the related field. Therefore,
one can process eight different field elements out of 3 bit length in the above
example of GF(23).
As an example multiplication of two field elements 010 and 100 is α3 which
results another field element 101.
2.2 The GCM Operation
The GCM performs authentication and encryption of data at high speeds for
both software and hardware implementations. Data integrity is achieved by
Galois Field (GF) multiplication operations while a symmetric key block ci-
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pher named Advanced Encryption Standard (AES ) is used for the purpose
of confidentiality. The GCM uses block cipher for authenticity. A block ci-
pher is a symmetric key cipher operating on fixed-length groups of bits, called
blocks [27]. The mode of operation defines how to repeatedly apply a cipher’s
block operation to transform amounts of whole plaintext which has been di-
vided into fix-sized blocks. The GCM requires a unique IV for each encryp-
tion operation. The IV must be random and should not repeat for other encryp-
tion. This leads to generation of different ciphertexts even the same plaintext
is encrypted multiple times with the same key. The security of AES-GCM de-
pends on the freshness of the nonce/key combination. Thus, we cannot use
statically configured keys. Instead, an automated key management system is
implemented. Authors in [4] have discussed four general key management
techniques i.e., Key Transport, Key Agreement, Key-Encryption Keys, and
Passwords. The GCM could be implemented in pipeline form, which results
in throughput of more than 10 Gbps. While in Tag generation process of the
GCM, a chained Galois multiplication is used, the sequential data (Ciphertext)
can be fed in through the pipeline form.
2.2.1 Encryption/Decryption in GCM
There are four inputs for the authenticated encryption, a secret key K with the
length based on the block cipher. An initialization vector IV , that can be any
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number between 1 and 264 that is unique for each application. A plaintext P,
that can have any number of bits between 0 and 239 − 256. Additional authen-
ticated data (AAD) denoted by A which is authenticated by the GCM module,
but not encrypted. AAD includes version numbers, port, address or other field
information can be a number between 0 and 264. There are two outputs: A
ciphertext C with the same length as the plain text P. An authentication tag T ,
whose length can be any value between 0 and 128.
The authenticated decryption operation has five inputs: K, IV, C, A, and T .
It either generates the plaintext P, or a FAIL signal once the inputs are not
authentic for the shared key.
Encryption Process
The plaintext P is divided into the blocks of 128 bit long. Let n and u be two
positive integers, then the total number of bits in P can be written as (n−1)128+
u where 1 ≤ u ≤ 128. As a result, P can be shown as P1, P2, . . . , Pn−1, P∗n,
which are called data blocks with the length of 128 bits except for the last block
that could be less than 128 bits.
Similarly, the ciphertext C is represented as C1, C2, . . . , Cn−1, C∗n. The
additional authenticated data A is also represented as A1, A2, . . . , Am−1, A∗m.
The total number of bits required for A can be written as (m− 1)128 + v, m and
v are two positive integers where 1 ≤ v ≤ 128.
The inputs A and C are formatted as above and the function GHAS H is
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defined by Xm+n+1 = GHAS H(H, A,C) as
Xi =

0 f or i = 0
(Xi−1 ⊕ Ai) · H f or i = 1, . . . ,m − 1
(Xm−1 ⊕ (A?m ‖ 0128−v)) · H f or i = m
(Xi−1 ⊕Ci−m) · H f or i = m + 1, . . . ,m + n − 1
(Xm+n−1 ⊕ (C?n ‖ 0128−u)) · H f or i = m + n
(Xm+n ⊕ (len(A)‖len(C)) · H f or i = m + n + 1
(2.8)
Two operations are used in (2.8) denoted by “ ⊕ ” for XOR and “ · ” for the
finite field multiplication over GF(2128) which is explained in previous section.
The len() function is used for generating the length block, its function is to
compute the total number of bits in the operand and returns a 64 bit value. AAD
and the ciphertext are applied to the len function, then the result is concatenated
to create the length block.
The sets of equation to define the authenticated encryption operation are
defined in [35] as follows
H = E(K, 0128)
U0 =
IV ‖ 0311 i f len(IV) = 96GHAS H(H, {}, IV) otherwise
Ui = incr(Ui−1) f or i = 1, . . . , n
Ci = Pi ⊕ E(K,Ui) f or i = 1, . . . , n
T = MS Bt(GHAS H(H, A,C) ⊕ E(K,U0)
(2.9)
In (2.9), “Hash Key” H is generated by the AES encryption of a 128 bit
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block of all zero. the incr() function increments the value of the the counter
U by one in each clock cycle. This value will be XORed with E(K,U0) which
is the AES encryption of shared key (K) and the initial counter value U0. At
the final stage, the Authentication Tag T is generated by choosing the t most
significant bits of the result. The initial value of the counter is U0 = (IV ‖
0311) if len(IV) = 96, otherwise GHAS H(H, {}, IV). The counter will be
incremented by one at each clock cycle using the incr() function. Then, the
AES encrypted value of the counter will be added to the plaintext Pi to generate
the ciphertext Ci which will be applied to the GHAS H calculator in (2.8).
2.2.2 The GCM Block Diagram
As stated in previous section, the main part of the GHAS H function in the
GCM is multiplication of (Xi−1 ⊕ Ci) by H in GF(2128). Figure 2.1 illus-
trates the block diagram for GCM. In this scheme, we consider sequential
structure for the multiplier and apply Ai or Ci and H in block-length of 128
in serial to GHAS H calculator in (2.8). In this figure, the 128-bit register
Y = (y127, ..., y2, y1, y0) will be initialized by all zeros at the beginning of
the clock cycle. Let Y (n) denote the contents of Y at the nth clock cycle. Let
Xi be the multiplier output at ith clock cycle. Furthermore, the initial value
of register X0 = Y (0) = (0, . . . , 0). Thus, the content of Y after the first clock
cycle shows as X1 = Y (1) = C1 · H, in the second clock cycle we obtain
X2 = Y (2) = (C1 · H + C2) · H, and the loop continues until we extract Xm+n+1
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in the (m + n + 1)th clock cycle as defined in (2.8).
Ai or encrypted Pi can be selected through the multiplexer based on the values
of m and n .
2.2.3 Review on GHASH
Software Implementation of High Performance GHASH Algorithms
Authors in [34] provide an efficient way of software implementation of high
performance GHASH function and also on the implementation of GHASH
using a carry-less multiplication instruction supplied by Intel. The work in-
cludes implementation of the high performance GHASH and its comparison
to the standard implementation of GHASH function. It also includes compar-
ison of the two implementations using Intels carry-less multiplication instruc-
tion. The proposed software implementations suggest that the new GHASH
algorithm can’t take advantage of the Intel carry-less multiplication instruc-
tion PCLMULQDQ. The work shows that the implementations done without
using the PCLMULQDQ instruction performs better. This suggest that the
new algorithm will perform better on embedded systems that do not support
PCLMULQDQ.
High Performance GHASH Function for Long Messages
Authors in [27] present a new method to compute the GHASH function. AS
the GHASH calculations consist of n successive multiply and addition over
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GF(2128) for a bit string made of n blocks of 128 bits each. In this work, they
propose a method to replace all but a fixed number of those multiplications by
additions on the field. This is achieved by using the characteristic polynomial of
H. They present how to use this polynomial to speed up the GHASH function
and how to efficiently compute it for each session that uses a new H.
An Architecture for the AES-GCM Security Standard
Authors in [37] present a fully pipelined and parallelized hardware architecture
for AES-GCM. The results from this thesis show that the round transforma-
tions of confidentiality and hash operations of authentication in AES-GCM
can cooperate very efficiently within this pipelined architecture. Furthermore,
this AES-GCM hardware architecture never unnecessarily stalls data pipelines.
This thesis provides a complete FPGA-based high speed architecture for the
AES-GCM standard, suitable for high speed embedded applications.
2.3 The AES Operation
AES [33], [13] is a symmetric block cipher with block-length of 128 bits. The
size of Key can be chosen from 128 bits, 192 bits, or 256 bits. Thus, the AES-
128 uses 10 rounds of operations, the AES-192 with 12 rounds of operations,
and AES-256 with 14 rounds of operations. The AES divides the plaintext into
16 bytes (128 bits). Thus, each block of 128 bits form an State array of 4 × 4.
The AES round functions perform the collection of GF operations:
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Figure 2.1: Block Diagram of AES-GCM
• SubBytes(GF inverse): The processing is done on each byte through an S-
Box which is a substitution table, where one byte is replaced with another
byte, based on a substitution algorithm. The SubBytes process scrambles
each byte.
• ShiftRows: The process is mixing data within rows. Row zero of the State
is not shifted, row 1 is shifted 1 byte, row 2 is shifted 2 bytes, and row 3
is shifted 3 bytes. The ShiftRows process scrambles each row.
• MixColumns(GF matrix multiplication): The process is mixing data within
columns. The 4 bytes of each column in the State are exchanged with an-
other 4-byte number through the finite field arithmetic. The MixColumns
process scrambles each column.
• AddRoundKey(GF addition): The encryption process is performed in this
part, when each byte in the current State is XORed with the subkey. The
subkey is formed based on specification of FIPS [13].
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Therefore, one round of AES on 128 bit plaintext consists of performing Sub-
Bytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, AddRoundKey. Then, the ciphertext with the
length of 128 bit is obtained.
Decryption is done through inverse AES functions. Thus, we perform the
followings for decryption: AddRoundKey, inverseMixColumn, inverseShiftRows,
inverseSubByte.
2.3.1 Fault Attacks and Detection in AES
Fault Attacks
As an example the authors in [15] show the fault attacks in the form of transient
fault on symmetric cryptosystems like AES have the following outcome:
• Modification of 1 byte of the Mix Columns input has an impact on 4 bytes.
• Modification of 1 byte between the Mix Columns of the 7th round and the
Mix Columns of the 8th round.
• The secret key can be recovered by using 2 faulty ciphertexts.
Therefore, the need for a robust fault detection method is highly demanded
to have much more protection for the integrity and authenticity of data over
the communication channels. As soon as the attacker can inject the fault into
the system, the fault detection module generates an error signal to prevent the
system to proceed to the next level. Thus, the attacker won’t be able to complete
the attack sequence. This thesis aims to create a reliable GCM module which
is capable of detecting permanent and transient faults.
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Fault Detection
There exists a large number of papers which offer different methods of fault
detection in the AES [24], [29], [39], [5]. The authors in [26] proposed a
lightweight concurrent parity-based fault detection scheme for the S-Box using
normal basis. This scheme can also be applied to the inverse S-Box. They in-
troduced the least area and delay overhead S-Box and its fault detection scheme
for the optimum composite field.
In this regard, high error coverage was achieved. The S-Box is a nonlinear op-
eration which takes an 8-bit input and generates an 8-bit output. In the S-Box,
the irreducible polynomial of f (x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 is used to construct
the binary field GF(28). Let X ∈ GF(28) and Y ∈ GF(28) be the input and the
output of the S-box respectively. Then, the S-Box consists of the multiplicative
inversion, i.e., X−1 ∈ GF(28), followed by an affine transformation. The affine
transformation consists of the matrix A and the vector b to generate the output
as y = Ax−1 +b where, y and x−1 are vectors corresponding to the field elements
Y and X−1 respectively.
In another section of the paper, the explanation of the composite field realiza-
tion of the multiplicative inversion using normal basis is discussed.
In the following sections of the referenced paper, the parity-based fault detec-
tion scheme of the S-Box using this realization is investigated. For the purpose
of fault coverage, the authors use multiple stuck-at fault model at the logic
level. This type of fault, which forces multiple nodes to be stuck at logic one
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(for stuck-at one) or zero (for stuck-at zero) independent of the fault-free logic
values, has been frequently used in the literature. It is noted that the presented
scheme is independent of the life time of the faults. Thus, both permanent and
transient stuck-at faults lead to the same fault coverage.
In the parity-based fault detection scheme of a block of logic gates, the parity
of the block is predicted and it is compared to the actual parity. The result of
this comparison is the error indication flag of the corresponding block. This
method is utilized in the literature to develop a fault detection scheme for dif-
ferent applications. The authors have divided the S-box into 5 blocks. This
results in low overhead parity predictions while maintaining the fault detection
required for the security-constrained environments.
Another fault detection scheme has been discussed in [16]. In SubBytes,
using the technique of parity to make the prediction parity for the SubBytes is
complex due to nonlinearity of this transformation. To protect the SubBytes,
the authors use the hardware redundancy method. They implement two Sub-
Bytes transformations in parallel. At the end of the SubBytes computation, the
results are compared and every discrepancy is considered as a fault.
The same method can be applied in the decryption process by using two In-
vSubBytes transformation in parallel. In ShiftRows, the output of the Sub-
Bytes transformation acts as the input to ShiftRows. Therefore, the output state
of ShiftRows is obtained by shifting the matrix state. To secure the ShiftRows
transformation, They used the scrambling method. This method consists of
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scrambling the output of ShiftRows. In MixColums and AddRoundKey, the
authors used cyclic redundancy check (CRC) for fault detection. The compar-
ison of CRC is made before and after each operation to detect the faults. They
showed more than 99% fault coverage with the area overhead of 22.51% and
frequency degradation of 13.86%.
2.4 Finite Field Multipliers In AES-GCM
In this section, we investigate the different types of multipliers and related area
and time complexity. The choice of the multiplier type in the AES-GCM de-
pends solely on the speed and area constrains of the application. There are
three different types of multipliers that can be used in the AES-GCM. These
are explained below. It is noted that in this thesis we have used the bit-parallel
one.
Bit-parallel Multipliers:
In this multiplier the inputs are being applied in word format with length of m
and the output will be the same word length. The modular reduction is applied
at the same time to obtain the field element as output. The area complexity in
this multiplier is O(m2) and requires 1 clock cycles to accomplish the result.
Block diagram of bit-parallel multiplier is shown in Figure 2.2.a.
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Bit-Level Multipliers:
Both multiplicand and multiplier are fed bit by bit through the shift register to
the multiplier input. There are two methods of applying the digits, MSB-first
and LBS-first. The area complexity is O(m) and requires m clock cycles for
completion. Block diagram of bit-level multiplier is shown in Figure 2.2.b.
Digit-Level Multiplier:
In this method, the operands are divided into k digit length to be applied to the
multiplier input . The area complexity is O(km) and required time for com-
pletion is mk clock cycles. Block diagram of digit-level multiplier is shown in
Figure 2.2.c.
Figure 2.2: Block Diagram of Multipliers a. Parallel b. Bit-level c. Digit-level
2.4.1 Low Complexity Multiplier in GF(2m)
In this section, we have an overview on a low complexity bit-parallel multiplier.
As mentioned, the multiplier plays an important role in AES-GCM module.
24 Chapter 2. Priliminaries and Literature Review
Therefore, the type of the chosen multiplier contributes towards the area and
operating frequency of the said module. The authors in [31] have shown an
approach towards low complexity bit parallel multiplier which will be used in
the following sections for the purpose of fault analysis.
They have shown that C = AB ∈ GF(2128) can be written as
c = (L + QTU)b (2.10)
Where b = [b0, b1, · · · , bm−1]T and T denotes transposition of vector. L and
U are two Toeplitz matrices whose elements consist of ais which are the coor-
dinates of A. L is m × m lower triangular matrix and U is (m − 1) × m upper
triangular matrix shown in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Demonstration of L, U, and b in Matrix Presentation.
Q is called the reduction matrix which is (m−1)×m and could be found through
the following relationship
α ↑= Qα mod F(α), (2.11)
where α ↑= [αm, αm+1, · · · , α2m−2]T and α = [1, α, α2, · · · , αm−1]T .
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Using (2.11), one can obtain the reduction matrix Q for the GCM in order
to figure out the single and multi-bit parity-based fault detection scheme. As-
suming α is the root of irreducible polynomial, then f (α) = 0 and we could
rewrite (2.5) as follows
α128 + α7 + α2 + α + 1 = 0. (2.12)
As in the finite field, −1 = +1 then one can derive the following equation
α128 = 1 + α + α2 + α7. (2.13)
Then, the first row of the reduction matrix Q is obtained as follows
α128 =
[
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 · · · 0
]










Next, we calculate the consecutive powers of α as
26 Chapter 2. Priliminaries and Literature Review
αi+128 = αi + αi+1 + αi+3 + αi+8 f or 1 ≤ i ≤ 120
α129 = α + α2 + α3 + α8
...
α248 = α120 + α121 + α122 + α127
(2.15)
We can outline α249 as follows
α249 = α121 + α122 + α123 + α128. (2.16)
Substituting α128 from (2.16), one can find
α249 = 1 + α + α2 + α7 + α121 +122 +α123
...
α253 = α4 + α5 + α6 + α11 + α125 + α126 + α127
(2.17)
As the final term is 2m − 2 = 254, then for α254 by using (2.13) we obtain
α254 = 1 + α + α2 + α5 + α6 + α12 + α126 + α127 (2.18)
Therefore, the Q matrix could be written using (2.13) as shown in Figure 2.4,
where R1 to R127 and C1 to C128 denote the row and column numbers respec-
tively.
From completed Q matrix, the QT could be written as shown in Figure 2.5.
Now, we rewrite (2.10) in matrix presentation as
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Hereafter, we name matrix E as E = L + QTU. As in the GCM module,
one of the multiplicands is always power of the Hash Key H, then L = z(H)
and U = g(H); Therefore, E is a function of H e.g. F = w(H). In the equation
c = Eb, we realize that the output of multiplier will be the function of H and
b. Thus, we use this characteristic to outline parity prediction module in terms
of the GCM elements and then define the single or multi-bit parity prediction
scheme in the entire GCM module in Chapter 4.
2.5 Fault Detection In Multiplier
There exists a large number of articles on fault detection in finite field multipli-
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Figure 2.5: QT demonstration 128 × 127
ers i.e., [7] [21] [9] [16] [3] [30] which demonstrate different methods of fault
detections. In this section we review briefly the related ones.
In [30], the authors propose fault detection architectures for GF(2m) multi-
pliers of both bit-parallel and bit-serial types. The polynomial basis is used to
represent the field elements. They develop parity prediction schemes for detect-
ing errors due to single and certain multiple faults during the multiplication op-
eration in the field. Fault detection architectures for traditional and bit-parallel
multipliers are presented. Explicit formulations for parity predictions of three
irreducible polynomials, namely, equally spaced polynomials, trinomials, and
pentanomials, are also investigated. Then, the authors have used similar tech-
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niques to develop fault detection architectures for both MSB-first and LSB-first
bit-serial multipliers. The actual parity of the multiplier output is computed by
the Binary Tree of XOR (BTX) gates. The predicted parity is calculated based
on the coordinates of the input and characteristics of finite field addition and
multiplication. Then, the outputs of these two parities are compared to detect
the faults. The double parity prediction method is also discussed given the par-
ity of the both inputs to the multiplier is known. The parity prediction block
uses both parities and the coordinates of the input to generate the double parity
prediction bits that will be compared with the actual parity bits of the multiplier
output to indicate Pass or Fail signal.
In [9], the paper provides the concurrent error detection scheme for all-
one polynomial to protect the encryption and decryption process against both
faults and attacks. To accomplish, The concept of REcomputing with Shifted
Operands (RESO) is selected.The RESO scheme employs time redundancy.
Assuming function F(x) to be a function unit and the function G(x) are related
by be G−1(F(G(x))) = F(x) for all input x. The results of two computations
are compared to indicate existence of error. The proposed method needs two
additional clock cycles.
In [3], the selected approach is based on the multiple parity bits and its
effect on area overhead and error detection probability. The paper discusses
the multiple bit errors in bit parallel and bit serial polynomial basis multipliers
with respect to selected number of parity bits in error detection scheme. In this
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approach, the m bit input is divided into k parts with one parity bit for each,
then the multiple parity prediction scheme is used to conduct the comparison
of predicted and actual blocks to detect any errors. The author demonstrates
that in the bit-serial implementation of GF(2163) PB multiplier using 8 parity
bits, the area overhead of 10.29% and probability of 0.996 are obtained. This
is achieved without increase in the computation time in multiplier.
Chapter 3
Single bit fault detection in GCM
3.1 Fault Detection Scheme
In this chapter, we introduce a novel single-bit parity prediction method in the
GCM loop. The parity prediction scheme is outlined and extended to include
the coordinates of the Ciphertext rather than the coordinates of the input to
the multiplier. The parity prediction scheme is derived using the properties of
GF(2128) with f (x) = x128 + x7 + x2 + x + 1 as irreducible polynomial. Then,
we compare the predicted and actual parities in order to detect the faults in the
GCM loop. For the purpose of fault detection in the GCM module, we assume
that the AES encryption part of the module is fault free or its fault could be
verified by known methods discussed in Chapter 2. Thus, our main concern
will be the fault detection in the GHAS H function of the GCM module.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the output of the GHAS H function is Xi whose par-
ity can be calculated using Binary Tree of XOR (BT X) gates or Linear Feed-
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back Shift Register (LFS R) to generate pXi. We need to predict the parity of
multiplier output Xi depicted as pˆXi to compare with the actual parity pXi in
order to generate PASS or FAIL signal as error indication output.
Let’s start with the sum module of Figure 2.1. The sum module denoted by
⊕ adds two elements in GF(2128) which is 128 2-input XOR gates to perform
additions over GF(2). The sum result is the bitwise XOR of Xi−1 and Ci shown
as
Di = Xi−1 + Ci = (x0 + c0, . . . , x127 + c127) ∈ GF(2128). (3.1)
Let pXi−1 and pCi denote the parity bit of Xi−1 = Yi and Ci respectively. To obtain










ci =pXi−1 + pCi. (3.2)
Equation (3.2) shows that the parity will be saved in the sum module and
remains intact during the operation. The output of sum module denoted by
Xi−1 +Ci is applied to the multiply module depicted as ⊗ to perform multiplica-
tion by Hash Key H over GF(2128) mod F(α) where α is the root of irreducible
polynomial f (x). Next, we figure out the parity prediction method in the mul-
tiply module in terms of the GCM elements e.g., Ci and H. The parity of the
multiplier output denoted by Xi will be a function of its input operands Di and
H or a function of parity for each operand.
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pXi = f (Di, H) = f (pDi, pH). (3.3)
This formulation shows that the parity of the output is a function of the
parity of input Ciphertext Ci and the parity of Hash Key H.
3.1.1 Parity for the powers of the Hash Key(H)
In this section, we focus on multiplication in GF(2128) to implement the parity
prediction scheme for the multiplier in the GCM. Authors in [30] have shown
the following characteristics of GF(2m) which we use to outline our fault de-
tection strategy over AES-GCM module.
Let A ∈ GF(2128) and α be a root of irreducible polynomial f (x), then each




aiαi ai ∈ {0, 1} (3.4)
Where ais are the coordinates of A with respect to polynomial basis.
The finite field multiplication of two elements A and B in GF(2128) could be
represented as
A mod F(α) = A ·
127∑
i=0
bi · ((Aαi) mod F(α)) =
127∑
i=0
bi · Z(i) (3.5)
Where
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Z(i) = α · Z(i−1) mod F(α) f or 1 ≤ i ≤ 127, Z(0) = A. (3.6)
In the AES-GCM module shown in Figure 2.1, the Hash Key H is encrypted
initially and remains constant throughout the Tag generation process. Using
this feature, we propose a parity prediction method in the GCM loop in terms
of the parity of H( j)s and parity of Ciphertext Ci in order to have low complexity
and space overhead. To Calculate the parity prediction of the multiplier output,
we need to compute the parity of H( j)s by using (3.6) as
H( j) = α.H( j−1)mod F(α) (3.7)
H and H · α could be written in terms of the its coordinate as follows
H = h0 + h1α + · · · + h127α127
H · α = h0α + h1α2 + · · · + h126α127 + h127α128
(3.8)
Since α is a root of irreducible polynomial and F(α) = 0, then α128=α7 +
α2 + α + 1. Therefore, substitution of α128 with its equivalent in (3.8) obtains
H · αmod F(α) as
H(1) = h0α + h1α2 + · · · + h126α127 + h127(α7 + α2 + α + 1) (3.9)
Thus, we can write the vector notation of H · αmod F(α) as
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h(1) = [h127, h0+h127, h1+h127, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6+h127, h7, . . . , h126]T . (3.10)
From (3.10) we conclude the important parity relationship between powers of
H as
pH(1) =pH(0) + h127
pH(2) =pH(1) + h126
...
...
pH(127) =pH(126) + h1.
(3.11)
3.1.2 Parity Prediction for the Multiplier in the GCM
The authors of [30] have derived the parity prediction formula for the multi-
plication of two arbitrary field elements which can be applied to the multiplier








The formulation of (3.12) constructs the foundation in parity prediction of
the AES-GCM module in this thesis. As the Hash Key H does not change
during the encryption process, the values of pH(i) could be precomputed and
stored in register PH at the beginning of each encryption. Then, we obtain
bitwise AND of PH register with Di.
36 Chapter 3. Single bit fault detection in GCM
Next, we calculate the predicted parity by performing XOR operation on
outputs as shown in Figure 3.1. The predicted parity can be compared with the
actual parity of the output to verify any odd numbers of stuck at-0 or stuck at-1
fault happened in the circuit under test (CUT ).
Figure 3.1: Parity prediction scheme
3.1.3 Fault Detection in the GCM Loop
We need to extend fault detection to include the parity of the actual Ciphertext.
Therefore, we rewrite Di in terms of the inputs of sum module. Thus, we can
rewrite (3.12) at the ith clock cycle as follows:
Xi = (Xi−1 + Ci)  pH = (Yi−1  pH) + (Ci  pH). (3.13)
where operator  denotes bitwise AND operation. Let Yi−1 and Ci represent
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the contents of Y register and Ciphertext Ci at the ith clock cycle respectively.
Therefore, the parity prediction of the GHAS H function at the ith clock cycle




y j pH( j) +
127∑
j=0
c j pH( j). (3.14)
where Yi−1 = (y0, . . . , y127) and Ci = (c0, . . . , c127). Figure 3.2 shows the
AES-GCM parity prediction scheme which is a realization of the key formula-
tion presented in (3.14).
The error indicator eout is generated using one XOR gate as shown in Fig-
ure 3.3. At every clock cycle the existence of error will be verified by detecting
logic 1 at eout. All needed at the output of the multiplier is to compute its parity
pXi using the BT X.
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Figure 3.2: AES-GCM loop parity prediction scheme
Figure 3.3: Output error indicator
Chapter 4
Multiple Parity Bit Fault Detection
Architecture
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we introduce a novel matrix-based multiple parity bit fault de-
tection method in the AES-GCM loop. As shown in [31] and discussed in
Section 2.4.1, the multiplier output Xi in Figure 2.1 can be represented as
Ed = (L + QTU)d, where E and d represent the H and Di inputs to the multi-
plier respectively.
First, we define the matrix E in terms of H and outline single and multiple bit
parity fault detection. Next, matrix-based CRC is introduced and related fault
detection scheme is investigated.
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4.2 Matrix-Based Parity Prediction Scheme in GCM Loop
4.2.1 Matrix-Based Single Parity Bit Scheme
In this section, we define the matrix- based parity prediction scheme for the
multiplier output. As the parity of the multiplier output Xi = C is defined by
pC =
∑127
i=0 ci, we show the matrix presentation of the output parity as
pC = oc, (4.1)
where c = [ c0 c1 . . . c127 ]
T and o = [ 1 1 · · · 1] is a 1 × 128 all one row
vector. For the purpose of output parity prediction, we need to use the
coordinates of the inputs to the multiplier which can be obtained from matrix
E as follows
pˆC = (oE)d, (4.2)
where d = [ d0 d1 · · · d127]T , oE is a function of H which is denoted as
[ 1 1 · · · 1][ f (H)]128×128. Thus, the parity prediction of the output will be
function of H and Di, i.e,
pˆC = f (H,Di), (4.3)
To outline the parity prediction architecture, we focus on computing the
outcome of oE instead of finding matrix E. Therefore, our new approach is to
obtain the parity of each column of oE instead of computing the actual multi-
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plication.
The Matrix QT shown in Figure 2.4 is multiplied by U in order to obtain QTU.
Let the number of 1s in the jth column of QT be r j. Then each element of U
in the jth row repeats r j times in each column of QTU. For example, the first
column of QT contains 4 Ones(1s) which causes each element of U in the first
row to appear 4 times in each column of QTU. The first column of U is all 0s
which does not have any effect once added to the first column of L. Thus, the
content of the first element of oE denoted by oE(1,1) is the parity of the first
column of L that is pH.
The second column of U has h127 in the first row and all 0s for the rest of
the column. Therefore, h127 appears four times in the second column of QTU
which has no effect on the parity of the second column of QTU because of the
even numbers of the repeats of h127 that cancels off the effect. The value of the
second element of the oE denoted by oE(1,2) is the parity of the second column
of L which is pH + h127. This pattern continues up to the element 122 with the
corresponding oE(1,122) =oE(1,121) + h7.
The pattern changes from the element 123 shown as
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oE(1,1) = pH
oE(1,j) = oE(1,j−1) + hm−(j−1) f or 2 ≤ j ≤ 122
oE(1,123) = h0 + h1 + h2 + h3 + h4 + h5 + h127
oE(1,124) = h0 + h1 + h2 + h3 + h4 + h126 + h127
oE(1,125) = h0 + h1 + h2 + h3 + h125 + h126 + h127
oE(1,126) = h0 + h1 + h2 + h124 + h125 + h126 + h127
oE(1,127) = h0 + h1 + h123 + h124 + h125 + h126 + h127
oE(1,128) = h0 + h122 + h123 + h124 + h125 + h126,
(4.4)
where oE(1,k) contains the pH(k). Figure 4.1 shows the logic implementation of
the matrix oE which is stored into the register oE.
The register oE can be used for single parity prediction and fault detection
in the AES-GCM loop using the same architecture shown in Figure 3.2. Thus,
the register oE replaces register pH while the rest of the scheme remains the
same for the purpose of fault detection.
4.2.2 Matrix-Based Random Parity Bit Scheme
In this section, we extend the parity prediction of (4.2) to double and then to
multiple parity bit scheme for the purpose of fault detection. Therefore, we
change the matrix o from 1 × 128 to O′ with a new dimension of k × 128 to
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Figure 4.1: Implementation of Matrix(Register) oE









1 · · · 0
1 · · · 0
... · · · ...
0 · · · 1
︸       ︷︷       ︸
O′ (k×128)
(E.d) (4.5)
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where O′can be a random matrix. The selected pattern of O′ depends on com-
plexity and fault coverage in the fault detection module. Double parity predic-
tion block diagram is shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Block Diagram of Double Bit Parity.
4.3 Matrix-based CRC for Multi-Bit Parity Fault Detection
4.3.1 Brief review on CRC
CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check) [8] [32], is a code for detecting errors in dig-
ital networks, data transmission, and storage devices. CRC has been adopted to
detect changes to data, but no error correction is made through it. In the CRC,
certain number of bits will be added to the message that is called checksum to
be transmitted together with the message. Then, the checksum of the received
message is computed and compared with the sent one to detect possible errors
occurred during the transmission.
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CRC treats the message as a polynomial in GF(2m). It is obtained by com-
puting the remainder of dividing the message polynomial into the divisor (gen-
erator) polynomial. For k−bit CRC, the generator polynomial must be of degree
k. Let denote the message as m(x) = mm−1xn−1 + · · · + m1x + m0, the generator
polynomial as G = g(x) = gkxk + · · · + g1x + 1; Then, we outline the CRC of
m(x) as follows:
m(x) mod g(x) = CRC(m). (4.6)
For k−bit CRC, the check value is k bits and the generator polynomial has
(k + 1) terms. A k−bit CRC is capable of detecting all errors of length ≤ k. If
G is x + 1, then the CRC denoted as CRC − 1 is called the parity bit to detect
single bit or odd number of errors. Most commonly used CRCs are CRC-12,
CRC-16, and CRC-32.
4.3.2 Matrix-Based Double Bit Parity CRC
In this section, we define the matrix-based CRC fault detection scheme using
the multiple parity bits for the multiplier module. Then, we extend the pro-
posed fault detection to the entire GCM loop. The multiplier output c(x) is a
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polynomial of degree 127 as shown below:
cTx = c(x)
[










where c(x) = c0+c1x+. . .+c127x127. For the purpose of double parity prediction
scheme, the generator polynomial is g(x) = x2 + x + 1. As the degree of
the generator polynomial is 2, the resulting remainder would be ax + b which
creates two bit parity for the purpose of fault detection. From (4.7), we realize
that the coordinates of the multiplier output c(x) can affect the output parities
after calculation of x mod g(x) which is independent of the output coordinates
and can be used as constant pattern for parity generation and prediction. Thus,
we conclude the following equation
c(x) mod g(x) = cT .(x mod g(x)) (4.8)
Now, we compute the x mod g(x) and establish the related matrix as






































Using (4.9), we realize a very important approach towards the proposed fault
detection by introducing the CRC of double bit parity matrix as pCRC−2 . Thus,











a, b ∈ {0, 1} (4.10)
To calculate the [pC1 pC2], one should multiply c
T by each column of
pCRC−2 separately. The hardware realization of this operation is bitwise AND of
multiplier output cT with column 1 and 2 of pCRC−2 . Then, we compute each
individual parity by performing XOR operations on the output bits to obtain
pC1 and pC2 respectively as shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Hardware implementation of Double Bit Parity Generator on multiplier output.
4.3.3 Matrix-Based Double Bit Parity Prediction CRC
In this section, we outline the parity prediction scheme using the matrix-based
CRC. Figure 4.1 demonstrates the content of matrix OE which is absolutely a
function of H. Therefore, matrix O′E is a function of H as well.
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As shown in Figure 4.5, the inputs to the GCM multiplier are H and Di. Thus,
matrix O′kE represents k bit parity prediction with regards to the multiplier in-
puts H and Di which is denoted by d(x) in polynomial basis. Using (4.9), we












where pˆ(CRC−k)d = [ pˆ0 pˆ1 · · · pˆk]T . As we are investigating double parity
bit fault detection, we replace the O′k with p
T
(CRC−2). Thus, we use (4.11) to
obtain the double bit parity prediction as follows
(pT(CRC−2)E)d = [pˆC1 pˆC2]. (4.12)
The computation of pT(CRC−2)E is given in appendix A which could be easily
implemented in hardware. In order to detect faults, we need to compare the
actual and the predicted parities to generate PASS or FAIL signal which is
called eout. If the compared parity pairs are the same, there is no error and eout =
0, otherwise an error signal is generated and eout = 1 as shown in Figure 4.4
50 Chapter 4. Multiple Parity Bit Fault Detection Architecture
which is the ”k − bit XOR Comparator” block depicted in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.4: Error signal generator.
4.3.4 Matrix-based k Bit Parity Fault Detection (k > 2)
For the k bit matrix-based fault detection scheme, one needs to define the gen-
erator polynomial which is degree of k. The generator polynomial can be irre-
ducible which gives the maximum number of checksums or remainders. There-
fore, we have the maximum code length of 2k − 1 and the code can detect all
one bit and double bit errors [18]. To improve the error detection capability,





primitive polynomial. The order of g
′
(x) is k − 1 and total code length will
be 2k−1 − 1, in this case all single, double, triple, and all odd number of errors
could be detected [36]. Table 4.1 illustrates the irreducible polynomials for the
CRC up to the degree 5. Higher degree polynomials can be found in [18].
After selection of the generator polynomial, we need to determine the pat-
tern of matrix pCRC−k with regards to chosen polynomial. To accomplish, we
calculate the set {1, x, x2, . . . , x127} mod g(x) which is called r js defined as
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k Irreducible Polynomial
1 x + 1, x
2 x2 + x + 1
3 x3 + x2 + 1, x3 + x + 1
4 x4 + x3 + x2 + x + 1, x4 + x3 + 1, x4 + x + 1
5 x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1, x5 + x4 + x3 + x + 1, x5 + x3 + x2 + x + 1, x5 + x4 + x2 + x + 1, x5 + x3 + 1, x5 + x2 + 1
Table 4.1: Irreducible Polynomials to the degree 5.
r j = x j mod g(x) for 0 ≤ j ≤ 127. Then, the remainder set {r1, r2, . . . , r128}
constructs the rows 1 to 128 of the parity matrix pCRC respectively. Table 4.2
shows the pattern for selected polynomials.






















0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1






Table 4.2: pCRC Matrix pattern for selected polynomials.
4.3.5 Fault Detection Architecture
At this stage, we load each column of pCRC−k matrix into k separate registers
called p( j)CRC−k where j indicates the jth column and 1 ≤ j ≤ k. pCRC−k does
not change in GCM encryption process which can be computed and stored
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permanently in the GCM module. Then, by implementing (4.10) and (4.8),
we figure out the actual parities and predicted k- bit parities to compare and
generate eout signal.
To extend the fault detection to the entire GCM loop, we outline the block
diagram of the model using k−bit parity prediction scheme in Figure 4.5. In
this scheme, we take into account the coordinates of the Ciphertext which is the
main element of the GCM module in the GHAS H function. As illustrated in
Figure 4.5, register Ci represents the coordinates of the ith Ciphertext, register
Xi is the current multiplier output, register Yi−1 is the content of Xi−1 + Ci. The
signal eout indicates presence of fault in each clock cycle.
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Since we have used the information redundancy technique in our fault detec-
tion scheme, a parity based Concurrent Fault Detection (CFD) has been inves-
tigated. In this chapter, we introduce the simulation testbench for the proposed
matrix-based multiple bit parity prediction CRC discussed in Chapter 4. First,
we implement the GCM scheme using VHDL language. Then, Modelsim SE
10.3 is applied to simulate the design. The fault injection is implemented in the
body of the main program using the VHDL language. TCL stimulus package
is employed to inject the faults and monitor the outputs. The different instances
of single, multiple bit, transient, and permanent stuck-at faults are injected into
the scheme and the results are investigated and further elaborated in the follow-
ing sections.
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5.2 VHDL Implementation of Fault Model
The main part of the GCM is multiplier module which is implemented through
equation C = (QTU + L) [31]. We can write the multiplier output of the GCM
module shown in Figure 4.5 as
xi = (L + QTU)di (5.1)
All elements of QTU and L are calculated and constructed in terms of the
coefficients of H. Matrix QTU is depicted in Figure 5.1. Matrix E represents
(L +QTU) which generates the multiplier output by performing multiplication
E.di over GF(2128) where di = (ci + xi−1) which are discussed in Chapter 2.
Therefore, we need to define all the matrices in terms of the VHDL language
which is demonstrated in appendix A.
For the purpose of fault injection and fault detection, the implementation
of all matrices and vectors must be done individually in VHDL to give us the
gate level access for the GCM module. Otherwise, we will not be able to cover
entire hardware to inject the faults. To accomplish this approach, we introduce
and add Element−S tuck−at− f ault to all elements of each matrix and vector
separately as follows
( Element(m, n) AND Element−S tuck−at−0(m, n)) OR Element−S tuck−at−1(m, n), (5.2)
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where Element(m, n) represents each vector or matrix defined in (5.1). As-
sociated Stuck-at-0 and Stuck-at-1 matrices are defined through the other in-
troduced matrices Element−S tuck−at−0 and Element−S tuck−at−1 respectively.
Element−S tuck−at−0 and Element−S tuck−at−1 are initialized to all 1s and all
0s subsequently. To switch on the fault injection in the Element(m, n), we need
to change Element−S tuck−at−0(m, n) to logic 0 or Element−S tuck−at−1 to logic
1 for the period of multiplication operation.
To continue to the next fault evaluation, we need to restore the injected fault into
the Element−S tuck−at− f ault to the initial no fault values in order to suppress
the effect of other faults on the current one. The flowchart of fault injection
method used in the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 5.2.
The first step is to initialize all the Element−S tuck−at− f ault matrices to proper
logic 1 and 0 which do not perform any fault injection to the any Element
matrix. Then, for each element of this matrix, one can inject Stuck-at-0 by set-
ting Element−S tuck−at−0(m, n) to logic 0. Next, the output of the GCM loop is
checked to detect the effect of the fault. We repeat the fault injection process for
Element−S tuck−at−1(m, n) respectively. All the elements of matrices are tested
against different faults and the results are captured for coverage calculations.
As an example, we show how to inject the fault in element(1, 2) = h127 of the
QTUmatrix illustrated in Figure 5.1. We have specified the corresponding fault
injection stuck at 0 and stuck at 1 matrices in the VHDL implementation as
US A−0 and US A−1 respectively, Thus, the presentation of the fault at element
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QTU(1, 2) is as follows
QTU(1, 2) = (h127 AND US A−0(1, 2)) OR US A−1(1, 2) (5.3)
To inject stuck at 0 respectively stuck at 1 for this element, we need to force
US A−0 to logic 0 respectively US A−1 to logic 1. This is done through the
scripting language explained in following sections. We repeat the process for
other matrices e.g., L, and E. For each element of QTU matrix which contains
more than one coordinates, we introduce two vectors named UUS A−0(l) and
UUS A−1(l) . UUS A−0(0) and UUS A−1(0) are inserted at QTU(1, 123) which
has two coordinates of H. From Figure 5.1, we illustrate the fault injection at
gate level of QTU(1, 123) = h6 + h127 as follws
QTU(1, 123) = (((h6 AND UUS A−0(0)) OR UUS A−1(0))
+ ((h127 AND UUS A−0(1)) OR UUS A−1(1)))
AND US A−0(1, 123)) OR US A−1(1, 123), (5.4)
The gate level illustration of (5.4) is shown in Figure 5.3.
After injection of faults for all matrices forming E in (5.2), the next step is to
inject fault for the other multiplier input di in E.di which leads to multiplication
result Xi. As E is 128 by 128 matrix, all coordinates of d appear in all coordi-
nates of output C = Xi. Thus, we need to define two matrices DS A−0(128, 128)
and DS A−1(128, 128) to calculate the effect of fault injection into each coordi-
nates of d. DS A−0(1, 1) to DS A−0(1, 128) inject stuck at 0 fault for d0 when
58 Chapter 5. Testing and Simulation
calculating c0 to c127. Respectively, DS A−0(2, 1) to DS A−0(2, 128) inject faults
for d1 and so on. For multiplier output C = Xi, we appoint CS A−0(128) and
CS A−1(128) to activate the fault injection .
5.3 Fault Injection in the GCM loop
As shown in Figure 5.4, the output of the multiplier is stored in register Yi−1.
Therefore, in the ith clock cycle we add the Ciphertext Ci with Yi−1. Then,
we apply (Ci + Yi−1) to the multiplier input to calculate (Ci + Yi−1).H. Thus,
we need to take into account the faults in register Y , Ci, and addition (XOR)
operation of these two. We need to define related fault injection vectors in the
VHDL program which are YS A−0, YS A−1, CS A−0, and CS A−1. To simulate
the fault injection, we define two registers to replace register Y as Y1 which is
applied to the main GCM loop calculations and Y2 which takes part in parity
prediction calculations. Therefore, one can inject the faults into the Y1 through
Tcl commands while the parity prediction part Y2 remains intact. The same
model is applied to Ci for the purpose of fault injection into the coordinates
of Ciphertext. The effect of fault injection on the fault coverage of the entire
GCM loop is discussed in the following sections.
5.4 Simulation Results
To evaluate the error detection capability of the proposed matrix-based parity
prediction scheme, the simulation is performed using ModelSim S E 10.3. The
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different cases of single and multiple bit faults are injected into the multiplier
module, Ciphertext coordinates, register, and adder in the scheme. The fault
injection is performed in different sections of the GCM loop using Tcl (Tool
Command Language) [2] which is programming/scripting language based on
concepts of Lisp, C, and Unix shells. Tcl can be used interactively, or by
running package based scripts to get the maximum performance with small
number of instructions. In Tcl we can change the value of the signals de-
fined in the main VHDL program. An example is given in (5.5) to change
US A−0(128, 128) to logic 0.
The command that injects S tuck−at−0 fault to QTU(128, 128) is as follows
Tcl command to set signal to 0 = f orce − f reeze US A−0(128, 128) 0 (5.5)
Enforcing the changes will take place by run command for specified time.
Then, we are able to monitor the waves (signals) already added to program
using −add wave command. After running the simulation and examining the
waves, we can set back the injected fault to initial no f ault value and continue
to the next fault injection as depicted in Figure 5.2. For investigating the fault
coverage with regards to the selected parity bits, we first add the signals needed
to be monitored, then single or multiple S tuck−at− f aults are injected into the
design entity for run time period. Finally, the error indicator signal is tested to
verify the fault coverage.
To switch from interactive to automated testing, we use f or loop command
in Tcl to inject and repeat all types of faults, all the results will be recorded in a
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file for further calculations. For the purpose of transient or permanent fault in-
jection, we can control the duration of the injected fault. For permanent faults,
the injected fault is not set back to original no f ault state during the entire test-
ing period. To control the duration of the faults in Tcl, we run the program for
specified period of time and examine the output waves or other signals using
the RUN [time ns]. The sample of Tcl-based fault injection is given in Ap-
pendix B. Another method of fault injection and testing is shown in Figure 5.5
which illustrates the simulation result to check the S tuck−at−0 for Hash Key H
input. In the VHDL program We have separated the H input to the multiplier
module and the parity prediction module in two different vectors called h, h1.
The vectors h and h1 are applied to multiplier input and the parity prediction
input separately. In the Tcl language we force the signals to the desired values,
run the simulation for 500 and check the error indicator output. For the first
period of 250 ns and the Clock rate of 50, we set h = h1 = ”0X...11” which
is 128 bit stream formatted in hexadecimal, and examine the error indicator
(EOUT ) which is 0 that means no error signal. Whereas, for the second period
of 250 ns, with assumption of h = ”0X...01” and h1 = ”0X...11”, the EOUT
will change to logic 1 indicating that the fault is detected.
The experimental results for different parity bit implementation and percent-
age of fault coverage are shown in Table 5.1. Selecting more than 4 parity bits
on fault detection will result more than 92% in fault coverage. By choosing 6
parity bits, we achieve 98% in fault coverage.
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CRC Parity Bits Number of fault injections Fault Coverage
Single bit Parity 300000 48%
Double bit Parity 300000 74%
3 Bit Parity 300000 87%
4 Bit Parity 300000 92.5%
5 Bit Parity 300000 96%
6 Bit Parity 300000 98%
Table 5.1: Fault coverage in the GCM loop versus selected parity bits.
5.5 Fault Detection Overhead and Delay Analysis
For the purpose of evaluating overhead and delay analysis, we selected Altera’s
Arria V GZ device which offers lower power and higher bandwidth compared
to other 28 nm FPGA devices for running applications upto 10Gbps. Therefore,
the overhead and timing analysis was performed by Quartus ‖ −64 Bit [10] .
Table 5.2 shows the effect of adding multiple bit parity fault detection scheme
into the CUT versus operating frequency and overhead of the fault free module.
GCM implementation Overhead in ALMs Longest Delay Path ns
Original :No fault Detection 3445(0%) 2.856
Single Parity 3466(2.8%) 3.387(18.5%)
Double Bit Parity 3665(6.3%) 3.472(21.5%)
3 Bit Parity 3672(6.6%) 3.482(21.9%)
4 Bit Parity 3805(10%) 3.493(22.3%)
5 Bit Parity 3814(10.7%) 3.506(22.7%)
6 Bit Parity 3823(10.9%) 3.515(23%)
Table 5.2: Area overhead and delay versus selected parity bits.
Probability of Fault Coverage for k-bit Parity
The authors in [17] show that the probability of fault coverage using k-bit parity
is calculated as 1 − 2−k. Therefore, the corresponding theoretical outcome for
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k = 1 to K = 6 are 50%, 75%, 87.5%, 93.7%, 96.8%, and 98.4% respectively.
Thus, the simulation results depicted in Table 5.1 with a good approximation,
supports the theoretical result discussed in this section. The proposed parity-
based fault detection scheme is capable of detecting almost all the injected
random faults.
Gate Level Complexity Analysis
Table 5.3 shows the area and critical path delay of the GCM fault detection
scheme versus the number of parity bits at gate level count. In order to obtain
the overhead percentage in the ASIC design, this analysis helps to provide exact
area and the cost of the parity prediction scheme. To obtain the chip area, we
take into account that the 2-input AND and 2-input XOR can be built using 6
and 10 transistors respectively.
CRC Parity Bits Area Complexity Critical Path Delay
Single bit Parity 399X + 128A 11TX + TA
Double bit Parity 780X + 512A 14TX + TA + TO
3 Bit Parity 1382X + 768A 19TX + TA + 2TO
4 Bit Parity 2237X + 1024A 27TX + TA + 2TO
5 Bit Parity 4156X + 1280A 30TX + TA + 3TO
6 Bit Parity 8097X + 1536A 39TX + TA + 3TO
Table 5.3: Gate level area overhead and delay versus selected parity bits, where TX , TA, and TO are the
propagation delays of XOR, AND, and OR Gate respectively.
False Alarms
The false alarms are the faults that do not cause any change in output or the
parity bits but are alarmed erroneous by the fault detection scheme. The false
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alarms is at most 0.12%, which can be ignored with respect to the total number
of fault injection that is 300000. Table 5.4 depicts the percentage of false alarm
obtained from simulation.
CRC Parity Bits Number of fault injections False Alarm
Single bit Parity 300000 270(0.09%)
Double bit Parity 300000 298(0.1%)
3 Bit Parity 300000 300(0.1%)
4 Bit Parity 300000 328(0.11%)
5 Bit Parity 300000 330(0.11%)
6 Bit Parity 300000 360(0.12%)
Table 5.4: False Alarm in the GCM loop versus selected parity bits.
Figure 5.6 shows the the graph of the simulation results.
5.6 Future Work
A future research can be based on obtaining the best CRC generator polyno-
mials in terms of area and timing overhead. Since the power consumption is
one of the main factors in each design, implementation of the fault detection
scheme into other FPGA devices or ASIC can also be investigated to achieve
lower area complexity, minimum critical path delay, and lower power optimiza-
tion.
As the GCM module takes advantage of the AES encryption in different parts,
a future research on combination of fault detection in the AES part and the
GCM loop can be very useful in order to reduce the area overhead and delay
of overall fault detection unit. The future research is to extend the concept of
single bit fault detection which is proposed in Chapter 3 to a multiple-bit fault
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detection scheme which is independent of the multiplier type used in the GCM
loop.
We need to investigate the concept of fault detection for other types of multi-
pliers discussed in Section 2.4. In this approach multiple bit parities are added
to the GCM loop and the propagation of faults with respect to the parity bits
are investigated to make the fault detection technique suitable for high perfor-
mance and low complexity applications.
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Figure 5.1: Demonstation of Matrix QTU .
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Figure 5.2: The flow chart of fault injection.
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Figure 5.3: Gate level fault injection for matrix element QTU(1, 123) .
Figure 5.4: The GCM loop and related components
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Figure 5.5: The simulation results.
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Figure 5.6: The simulation results graph: (a) fault coverage, (b) critical path delay, (c) area overhead,
and (d) false alarm versus the number of parity bits.
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-- Multiplier, Pentanomial (GCM_pentanomial_multiplier.vhd)
--
-- Computes the multiplication in GF(2ˆ128) for GCM Loop
--







generic (M: natural := 128);
--"h" stands for Hask Key "H" of the GCM module
port (
h1,h,b: in std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
c: out std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
signal P: out std_logic_vector (3 downto 0);
-- Output Parity Prediction:PP(0) to PP(2);
signal PP: out std_logic_vector (3 downto 0)
);
end GCM_pentanomial_multiplication;
architecture structure of GCM_pentanomial_multiplication is
type Umatrix is array (M downto 1,M downto 1) of std_logic;
type Lmatrix is array (M downto 1,M downto 1) of std_logic;
type USAmatrix is array (M downto 1,M downto 1) of std_logic;
signal D: std_logic_vector (M-1 downto 0);
signal E: std_logic_vector (M-2 downto 0);
-- Output Parity :P(0) to P(2);
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signal pp_temp : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
signal p_temp : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
-- Copy of Multiplier output for parity calculation purpose;
signal CO: std_logic_vector (M-1 downto 0)
:= x"00000000000000000000000000000000";
-- The OE matrix for parity prediction purpose
signal OE: std_logic_vector (M-1 downto 0)
:= x"00000000000000000000000000000000";
signal EOUT: std_logic_vector (1 downto 0) :="00";
-- CRC Pattern for f(x)=xˆ2+x+1 : 2 bit parity construct
constant CRC1: std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0)
:= x"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF";
constant CRC2: std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0)
:= x"B6DB6DB6DB6DB6DB6DB6DB6DB6DB6DB6";
constant CRC3: std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0)
:= x"55555555555555555555555555555555";
-- CRC pattern for f(x)=xˆ3+x+1 : 3 bit parity construct
--constant CRC1: std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0)
:= x"74E9D3A74E9D3A74E9D3A74E9D3A74E9";
-- constant CRC2: std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0)
:= x"3A74E9D3A74E9D3A74E9D3A74E9D3A74";
--constant CRC3: std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0)
:= x"BAEBAEBAEBAEBAEBAEBAEBAEBAEBAEBA";








signal L ,EM: Lmatrix;
begin
-- Q ’Transpose’ multiply by U
Initialization_of_QTU_matrix: process(U,USA_0,USA_1,LSA_0,LSA_1,U_temp)
begin
for j in 1 to 128 loop










for i in 123 to 127 loop
U(1,i)<= h(127-(i-2))xor h(127-(i-123));
end loop;
U(1,128)<= h(1)xor h(122) xor h(127);
---2nd Row
U(2,1)<=’0’;U(2,2)<=h(127);




for i in 124 to 127 loop
U(2,i)<=h(127-(i-2))xor h(127-(i-3))xor h(127-(i-124)) xor h(127-(i-123));
end loop;
U(2,128)<=h(1) xor h(2) xor h(122) xor h(123) xor h(127);
---3rd Row
U(3,1)<=’0’;U(3,2)<=h(127);U(3,3)<=h(127) xor h(126);
for i in 4 to 122 loop
U(3,i)<=h(127-(i-2))xor h(127-(i-3))xor h(127-(i-4));
end loop ;
U(3,123)<=h(6)xor h(7)xor h(8)xor h(127);
U(3,124)<=h(5) xor h(6)xor h(7)xor h(127) xor h(126);
for i in 125 to 127 loop
U(3,i)<=h(127-(i-2))xor h(127-(i-3))xor h(127-(i-4))xor(
h(127-(i-125))xor h(127-(i-124)) xor h(127-(i-123)));
end loop;
U(3,128)<=h(1) xor h(2) xor h(3) xor h(122) xor h(123)xor h(124) xor h(127);
---4th Row
U(4,1)<=’0’;U(4,2)<=’0’;U(4,3)<=h(127);U(4,4)<=h(127) xor h(126);
for i in 5 to 123 loop
U(4,i)<=h(127-(i-3))xor h(127-(i-4))xor h(127-(i-5));
end loop ;
U(4,124)<=h(6)xor h(7)xor h(8) xor h(127);
U(4,125)<=h(5)xor h(6)xor h(7) xor h(126) xor h(127);
for i in 126 to 128 loop
U(4,i)<=h(127-(i-3))xor h(127-(i-4))xor h(127-(i-5))xor(




for i in 5 to 124 loop
U(5,i)<=h(127-(i-5))xor h(127-(i-4));
end loop ;
U(5,125)<= h(6)xor h(7) xor h(127);
U(5,126)<=h(5)xor h(6)xor h(126) xor h(127);
U(5,127)<= h(4)xor h(5) xor h1(125)xor h(126)xor h(127);
U(5,128)<=h(3) xor h(4) xor h(124)xor h(125) xor h(126);
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---6th Row
U(6,1)<=’0’;U(6,2)<=’0’;U(6,3)<=’0’;U(6,4)<=’0’;




U(6,127)<=h(5)xor h(126) xor h(127);
U(6,128)<=h(4)xor h(125)xor h(126) xor h(127);
---7th Row







for i in 2 to 122 loop
U(8,i)<=h(127-(i-2));
end loop ;





for i in 3 to 123 loop
U(9,i)<=h(127-(i-3));
end loop ;





for i in 4 to 124 loop
U(10,i)<=h(127-(i-4));
end loop ;




for i in 1 to 4 loop
U(11,i)<=’0’;
end loop;


















---14th to 120th Row
for j in 14 to 120 loop





for i in 1 to 121 loop
U(121,i)<=’0’;
end loop ;

















for i in 124 to 128 loop

















U(125,125)<= h(127) xor h(126);
for i in 126 to 128 loop
U(125,i)<= h(127-(i-124))xor h(127-(i-125)) xor h(127-(i-126));
end loop ;
---126th Row




U(126,126)<= h(127) xor h(126);
U(126,127)<= h(127)xor h(126)xor h(125);
U(126,128)<= h(124)xor h(125)xor h(126);
--127th Row





U(127,128)<= h(125)xor h(126)xor h(127);
---128th Row










U(128,128) <=h(121)xor h(126)xor h(127);
end process Initialization_of_QTU_matrix;
Initialization_of_L_matrix:process(L,h)
variable t,s: integer ;
begin
t:=1;
for j in 1 to 128 loop












for j in 1 to 128 loop
for i in 1 to 128 loop









for j in 1 to 128 loop
for i in 1 to 128 loop
cc_temp:= (EM(j,i) and b(i-1))xor cc_temp;
end loop;








variable pt : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable crc_temp1 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable crc_temp2 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable crc_temp3 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable k :integer;
begin
for i in 0 to 3 loop
pt(i):=’0’;
end loop ;
for i in 0 to M-1 loop -- Parity of Multiplier output
pt(0):= CO(i) xor pt(0);
end loop;
-- Parity of Multiplier output with CRC pattern # 1 applied.
crc_temp1:= CO and CRC1;
for i in 0 to M-1 loop
pt(1):= crc_temp1(i) xor pt(1);
end loop;
pt(2):=’0’;
-- Parity of Multiplier output with CRC2 pattern # 2 applied.
crc_temp2:= CO and CRC2;
for i in 0 to M-1 loop
pt(2):= crc_temp2(i) xor pt(2);
end loop;
-- Parity of Multiplier output with CRC pattern # 3 applied.
pt(3):=’0’;
crc_temp3:= CO and CRC3;
for i in 0 to M-1 loop
pt(3):= crc_temp3(i) xor pt(3);
end loop;







variable pH : std_logic_vector(1 downto 0):="00";
variable pt : std_logic_vector(3 downto 0);
variable crc_temp1 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable crc_temp2 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable crc_temp3 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable OEB : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable OEB_temp : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable OEB_temp1 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable OEB_temp2 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable OEB_temp3 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable OEB_temp4 : std_logic_vector(M-1 downto 0);
variable k,k1,s1,k2,s2: integer;
begin
-- initialization of parity variable
for i in 0 to 3 loop
pt(i):=’0’;
end loop ;
for i in 0 to 1 loop
pH(i):=’0’;
end loop ;
--pH:="00"; -- OE construction
OEB_temp := h1;
for i in 0 to M-1 loop
-- Calculating the Parity of H :pH(0)




for i in 1 to 121 loop
OEB_temp1(i):=OEB_temp1(i-1) xor h1(M-i);
end loop;
OEB_temp1(122):= h1(0) xor h1(1) xor h1(2) xor h1(3)
xor h1(4) xor h1(5) xor h1(127);
OEB_temp1(123):= h1(0) xor h1(1) xor h1(2) xor h1(3)
xor h1(4) xor h1(126) xor h1(127);
OEB_temp1(124):= h1(0) xor h1(1) xor h1(2) xor h1(3)
xor h1(125) xor h1(126) xor h1(127);
OEB_temp1(125):= h1(0) xor h1(1) xor h1(2) xor h1(124)
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xor h1(125) xor h1(126) xor h1(127);
OEB_temp1(126):= h1(0) xor h1(1) xor h1(123) xor h1(124)
xor h1(125) xor h1(126) xor h1(127);
OEB_temp1(127):= h1(0) xor h1(122) xor h1(123) xor h1(124)
xor h1(125) xor h1(126) ;
OE <= OEB_temp1;
-- End of OE Construction
-- bitwise AND of Register OE & input b
OEB_temp2:= OEB_temp1 and b;
-- Prediction Parity of Multiplier output
for i in 0 to M-1 loop
pt(0):= OEB_temp2(i) xor pt(0);
end loop;
-- Prediction Parity of Multiplier output with1 CRC pattern # 1 applied.
crc_temp1:= OEB_temp2 and CRC1;
for i in 0 to M-1 loop




for i in 0 to 42 loop
OEB_temp3(0) := OEB_temp3(0) xor h1(i*3);
end loop;
------
OEB_temp3(1):= OEB_temp1(1) xor h1(127);
--Added
for i in 1 to 42 loop
OEB_temp3(1) := OEB_temp3(1) xor h1(i*3-1);
end loop;
------
OEB_temp3(2):= OEB_temp1(2) xor h1(127) xor h1(126);
--Added
for i in 1 to 42 loop
OEB_temp3(2) := OEB_temp3(2) xor h1(i*3-2);
end loop;
------
OEB_temp3(3):= OEB_temp1(3) xor h1(126) xor h1(125);--changed from (127)
--Added
for i in 1 to 42 loop





for j in 4 to 120 loop
OEB_temp3(j) := OEB_temp1(j)xor h1(127-(j-1))xor h1(127-(j-2))xor h1(127-(j-4)) ;
--Added
for i in 1+k to 42 loop





OEB_temp3(121):= h1(127) xor h1(7)xor h1(8)xor h1(10)xor h1(1)
xor h1(3)xor h1(4)xor h1(6)xor h1(0);-- h2,h5
OEB_temp3(122):= h1(126) xor h1(127)xor h1(6)xor h1(7)xor h1(9)
xor h1(0)xor h1(2)xor h1(3)xor h1(5);--h1,h4
OEB_temp3(123):= h1(125) xor h1(126) xor h1(127)xor h1(5)xor h1(6)
xor h1(8)xor h1(1)xor h1(2)xor h1(4);--h0,h3
OEB_temp3(124):= h1(124) xor h1(125)xor h1(126) xor h1(4)xor h1(5)
xor h1(7)xor h1(0)xor h1(1)xor h1(3); --h2
OEB_temp3(125):= h1(123)xor h1(124) xor h1(125)xor h1(127)xor h1(3)
xor h1(4)xor h1(6)xor h1(0)xor h1(2); --h1
OEB_temp3(126):= h1(122) xor h1(123)xor h1(124) xor h1(126) xor h1(127)
xor h1(2)xor h1(3)xor h1(5)xor h1(1);--h0
OEB_temp3(127):= h1(121) xor h1(122) xor h1(123) xor h1(125)xor h1(126)
xor h1(1)xor h1(2)xor h1(4)xor h1(0);
-- Prediction Parity of Multiplier output with CRC pattern # 2 applied.
crc_temp2:= OEB_temp3 and b;
for i in 0 to M-1 loop
pt(2):= crc_temp2(i) xor pt(2);
end loop;
-- Prediction Parity of Multiplier output with CRC pattern # 3 applied.






for j in 0 to 120 loop
for i in 0 to 63-s1 loop






for j in 1 to 120 loop
for i in 0 to 62-s2 loop
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OEB_temp4(122):= h1(127) xor h1(0)xor h1(2)xor h1(4);
OEB_temp4(123):= h1(126) xor h1(1)xor h1(3);
OEB_temp4(124):= h1(125)xor h1(127)xor h1(0)xor h1(2);
OEB_temp4(125):= h1(124) xor h1(126) xor h1(1);
OEB_temp4(126):= h1(123)xor h1(125)xor h1(127)xor h1(0);
OEB_temp4(127):= h1(122) xor h1(124) xor h1(126) xor h1(127);
pt(3):=’0’;
crc_temp3:= OEB_temp4 and b;
for i in 0 to M-1 loop






variable E_state : std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);
begin
if ( pp_temp = p_temp )
then
E_state := E_state and "00";
EOUT <= E_state ;
else







# set the simulation step size as a global variable





# a count of the elapsed runtime
set runtime 0




# set m1 0x76543210





add wave -logic h
add wave -logic h1
add wave -logic b
add wave -logic c
add wave -logic P
add wave -logic PP
add wave -logic EOUT
#m($0)=1
set filename "Multiplier_Error.txt"
# open the filename for writing
set fileId [open $filename "w"]
# apply all 64 (2ˆ6) possible inputs to the design
for {set i 0} {$i < 1000} {incr i} {
# force signals based on a mask of the integer i
#force -freeze h [expr $m1 || $m ]
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#${m2}= ${m1} & ${m}
#force -freeze h [ format "%0x" [expr {$m >> $i | $m1}]]
#main force -freeze h [ expr $m >> 1 | $m1]
incr j
if { $j < 390} {
force -freeze h [ expr $m >> $i | $m1]
}
if { $j >= 390 } {
set m1 0x000000000000000056700000000000001
force -freeze h [expr $m1]
}
#force -freeze h [format "%0x" [expr $m1]]+[format "%0x" [expr $m2]]
# force -freeze h $($m >> $i | $m1 )
force -freeze h1 128’h00000000000000056700000000000001
force -freeze b 128’h00004400000020000009000000000012
run 250
set simOut [examine -binary /EOUT]
if { $simOut != "2’b00"} {
incr Error_Detected
# puts -nonewline $fileId $Error_Detected
# puts -nonewline $fileId $simOut
}
}
# Create Error lof file when performing exhaustive test
# set filename "Multiplier_Error.txt"
# open the filename for writing
# set fileId [open $filename "w"]
# write the number of error occurance " the data to the file -
puts -nonewline $fileId $Error_Detected
# puts -nonewline $fileId $simOut




# after the simulation is complete, view the results
view wave
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